SOP: Indian Vessels and Seafarers in the Maritime Security Risk Area

Certain maritime areas and navigable waters across the globe constitute corridors of critical strategic and commercial significance for international maritime navigation. The continued safety, security, and predictability of passage through such waters is of paramount importance for the smooth functioning of global seaborne trade and for the protection of seafarers serving aboard vessels operating in these environments. In recognition of the operational and security challenges associated with navigation in such areas, the Directorate General of Maritime Administration had previously issued DGS Order No. 02 of 2025. This SOP constitutes a consolidated, authoritative, and operationally actionable framework governing the response of Indian flag vessels, shipping companies, and other regulated entities to maritime security threats. The SOP consolidates and supersedes earlier guidance issued through individual circulars, establishes a unified Maritime Security Risk Area framework, and prescribes clear protocols for risk assessment, reporting, crew protection, voyage planning, and engagement with competent naval and security authorities.

The DGS Circulars listed below shall continue to remain in force and shall retain their independent legal effect as instruments issued under the authority of the Directorate General of Shipping. This SOP consolidates the operational guidance dispersed across those Circulars into a single structured reference instrument, with the objective of providing clarity, eliminating potential inconsistencies arising from multiple overlapping documents, and enabling shipowners, ship management companies, Masters, RPSL companies, and seafarers to implement their obligations under those Circulars in a coherent and systematic manner.

The following international conventions and instruments are legally binding on vessels and their operators to the extent applicable by Flag State, Port State, and by the terms of their engagement. Where this SOP prescribes a course of action, it does so by way of structured guidance for the implementation of existing obligations in the specific context of the High Risk Area, or as a recommendation informed by best practice. The word ‘shall’ in this SOP, where it appears in connection with matters already covered by a binding instrument, reflects that instrument’s existing obligation.

This SOP has been prepared with the following objectives:

• (a) To consolidate all maritime safety and security circulars, notices, and other documents issued by the Directorate General of Maritime Administration into a single comprehensive operational reference, thereby reducing ambiguity and ensuring greater clarity and consistency in the guidance applicable to vessels transiting high-risk maritime areas.
• (b) To provide structured operational guidance for the implementation of existing ISM Code and ISPS Code obligations in the specific context of the High Risk Area.
• (c) To establish a clear chain of reporting and coordination obligations for all maritime stakeholders during a hostile incident.
• (d) To safeguard the life, safety, welfare, and dignity of Indian seafarers in conflict-affected maritime regions.

This SOP applies to:

• (a) All Indian flag vessels operating in the HRA as defined in paragraph A.7 below.
• (b) All foreign flag vessels employing Indian seafarers through Indian RPSL companies and operating in the HRA.
• (c) All shipowners, ship management companies, Masters, and operators deploying Indian seafarers in the HRA.
• (d) All RPSL companies engaged in the deployment of Indian seafarers on vessels operating in the HRA.
• (e) All Company Security Officers and Ship Security Officers responsible for vessels covered under this SOP.

The following terms are defined for the purposes of this SOP:

Prior to entering the HRA, the shipowner or ship management company shall ensure that a comprehensive voyage-specific risk assessment is conducted by the Company Security Officer in consultation with the Master, in accordance with ISM Code obligations and consistent with the methodology in BMP MS (2025). The risk assessment shall consider at a minimum:

• (a) Prevailing security threats as identified in the current MISTO, JMIC advisory notes, IFC-IOR advisories, and DGS circulars.
• (b) Geopolitical developments including the current state of the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis.
• (c) Recent incidents reported by JMIC, UKMTO, and IFC-IOR, including drone strikes, missile attacks, USV attacks, electronic warfare events, and illegal boarding attempts.
• (d) The nature of the cargo on board, particularly flammable, hazardous, or explosive cargo. The OCIMF tanker hull vulnerability study conducted in conjunction with QinetiQ is advised for consultation by tanker operators.
• (e) Vessels with Israeli commercial connections (owner, charterer, or manager) shall apply a heightened threat perception, as confirmed in DGS Circular No. 27 of 2023 and the OCIMF LM information paper.
• (f) AIS data exposure: open-source AIS voyage history has been exploited by hostile targeting systems. The risk-benefit of limiting AIS data fields shall be assessed per transit segment, noting that Iranian forces have also cited vessels not transmitting AIS as a pretext for interdiction.
• (g) GNSS reliability: significant GNSS jamming and spoofing is active across the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. Vessels must prepare for degraded positional integrity and cross-check with alternative positioning methods including celestial observation, radar range-bearing, and depth sounding.
• (h) War risk insurance status, including whether current coverage extends to the intended itinerary and whether Notice of Cancellation buy-back underwriting is required.

Before any vessel enters the HRA, shipowners, ship management companies, and RPSL companies shall ensure:

• (a) Valid war risk insurance covering all seafarers deployed in the HRA, with coverage extending from HRA entry to safe exit, and including compensation for injury, disability, or death from hostile incidents, acts of war, armed conflict, sabotage, and drone, missile, or explosive attacks. JMIC has noted that war risk availability may now operate as a primary gating factor for transit decisions in the current crisis.
• (b) Full compliance with the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, including war risk bonuses, enhanced insurance coverage, compensation provisions, and repatriation rights.
• (c) Where Notice of Cancellation has been received from war risk underwriters, buy-back arrangements shall be in place before the vessel proceeds into the HRA.

The SSP shall be reviewed and updated by the CSO and SSO before the vessel enters the HRA. Security level shall be set consistent with the Flag State declaration. The following enhanced measures form part of the SSP implementation obligations at the applicable security level in the HRA:

• (a) Additional security watchkeeping on deck and on the Bridge with 360-degree surveillance.
• (b) Continuous monitoring of small craft, USVs, and aerial objects. Radar watch shall be maintained for small, fast-moving contacts; radar software upgrades for small airborne target detection should be applied where available.
• (c) Restriction and control of access to all restricted areas of the vessel.
• (d) SSAS shall be tested and confirmed operational before entering the HRA and shall remain armed at all times. SSAS activation in the event of a security incident is a SOLAS obligation.
• (e) Full implementation of BMP MS (2025) protective measures applicable to the HRA threat environment.
• (f) AIS data management shall be implemented in accordance with the voyage risk assessment outcome under paragraph B.1.

The Master shall conduct and document a comprehensive security briefing for all crew before entering the HRA. The briefing shall include:

• (a) An overview of the current security environment based on the MISTO, JMIC advisory, and applicable DGS circulars.
• (b) All identified threat categories: missiles; loitering munitions (including Shahed-136 type); water-borne drones and USVs; explosive speed boat attacks; limpet mine threats; GNSS jamming and spoofing; and illegal boarding, detention, or seizure.
• (c) LM-specific detection guidance per the OCIMF LM information paper: LMs may be detected acoustically before visual sighting; the radar cross-section is small and an all-round audible and visual lookout must be maintained simultaneously.
• (d) Emergency response procedures, alarm signals, individual emergency duties, and immediate crew actions in the event of attack.
• (e) Location of the citadel or safe muster point. The citadel shall be above the waterline within the structural protection of the accommodation.
• (f) Emergency escape routes from the Bridge Deck and Monkey Island to the main deck, noting that standard routes may be compromised by structural damage from external attack.
• (g) Actions to be taken if the PA system, internal communications, or walkie-talkies fail due to incident damage.

The following emergency drills, which give effect to mandatory SOLAS Chapter III and ISPS Code obligations, shall be conducted before entering the HRA and at regular intervals during HRA operations:

• (a) General emergency and fire response, giving effect to SOLAS Regulation III/19.
• (b) Abandon ship and lifeboat launching drill.
• (c) Man overboard drill.
• (d) Security drill covering response to aerial LM or drone detection, response to USV or explosive speed boat threat, and response to illegal boarding attempt.
• (e) Emergency escape drill without using normal accommodation access routes, addressing scenarios where structural damage from an external attack has compromised standard routes.
• (f) Citadel muster drill to confirm crew can reach the designated safe area within an operationally effective time.
• (g) Where practicable, a Ship-Shore Emergency Communication drill to verify GMDSS and satellite communication channels with the nearest MRCC or DGComm Centre.

All GMDSS equipment, satellite communication systems, emergency transmitters, and portable communication devices shall be tested and confirmed fully operational before HRA entry, in accordance with SOLAS Chapter IV obligations. The Company Security Officer shall, before HRA transit, email DGComm Centre and IFC-IOR with vessel particulars including: vessel name, IMO number, MMSI, call sign, satellite email and telephone, last port, next port, and key transit points with estimated times of arrival.

All vessels transiting the HRA shall register and submit daily position reports via the online IFC-IOR Ship Reporting Form at http://117.219.8.190/ifcior/, in accordance with DGS Circular No. 08 of 2024. This replaces the Annexure I email format of DGS Circular No. 27 of 2023. Vessels shall simultaneously register with UKMTO under the VRS scheme applicable to UKHO Security Chart Q6099.

The Master and ship management company shall ensure that all life-saving appliances and firefighting equipment on board are maintained in full working condition in accordance with SOLAS Chapters II-2 and III and the LSA Code. In view of incidents documented in DGS Circular No. 10 of 2026 where seafarers were trapped in accommodation areas following missile and drone strikes, consideration should be given to pre-positioning spare life jackets on the main deck. All crew shall be fully trained in the location and use of EEBDs already required by SOLAS. Supplementary medical kits for trauma, burns, blast, and shrapnel injuries are recommended as appropriate to the HRA context.

Shipowners shall review and maintain safe manning levels in accordance with the vessel’s Safe Manning Certificate and IMO Resolution A.1047(27), and shall consider augmenting the crew for enhanced 24x7 watchkeeping in the HRA without causing fatigue. Seafarers’ rest periods shall comply with MLC 2006 Standard A2.3 and the STCW Convention Chapter VIII requirements.

RPSL companies shall comply with the following before deployment of Indian seafarers on vessels operating in the HRA: updated records of all Indian seafarers deployed in or near the HRA (names, passport details, vessel name, flag state, IMO number, ship management company, and family emergency contacts) shall be maintained and submitted to DGS Crew Branch and DGComm Centre. This SOP and all applicable DGS circulars shall be formally communicated to all shipowners and ship managers employing seafarers placed by the RPSL company. A 24x7 emergency contact facility for the families of deployed seafarers shall be established and maintained.

All seafarers on watch shall maintain a 360-degree continuous lookout using all available means, in accordance with STCW Chapter VIII obligations. In the HRA this includes specific vigilance for: suspicious small craft, unidentified boats, USVs, and aerial objects; acoustic detection of approaching loitering munitions, which per the OCIMF LM information paper may be heard before being seen; missile trails, flashes, or impacts; and continuous monitoring of navigational warnings and maritime security advisories from DGComm Centre, IFC-IOR, UKMTO, JMIC, and NAVAREA broadcasts. Any suspicious activity or security concern shall be reported immediately to DGComm Centre and IFC-IOR, consistent with DGS Circular No. 08 of 2024.

GNSS jamming and spoofing causing positional offsets, AIS anomalies, and signal loss is actively reported across the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. JMIC has assessed this as a risk amplifier. The following shall apply: navigators shall cross-check GPS position against radar range and bearing from charted objects, celestial observation where practicable, and depth soundings; AIS anomalies shall be identified and collision avoidance shall not rely solely on AIS; GNSS disruption, jamming, or spoofing events shall be reported to DGComm Centre, IFC-IOR, and UKMTO and recorded in the logbook.

When at anchor or in port within the HRA, the following enhanced security precautions shall apply: enclosed space entries shall be limited strictly to what is necessary for safety or operationally essential purposes, with confined space entry procedures per SOLAS Regulation XI-1/7 followed without exception; the number of personnel in machinery spaces shall be minimised; non-essential maintenance and repair work should be deferred until the vessel has safely exited the HRA; a 360-degree continuous watch shall be maintained in accordance with STCW and ISPS obligations, with particular attention to approaching boats, USVs, and unusual waterborne activity; and identification of porthole-accessible emergency cabin exits, emergency escape ropes and ladders, and pilot or emergency ladders at multiple hull positions are recommended measures arising from lessons learned from actual HRA incidents.

In the event of a missile strike, LM impact, drone attack, USV attack, explosive boat collision, limpet mine detonation, or any other hostile incident, the Master or officer of the watch shall activate the General Emergency Alarm in accordance with SOLAS Regulation III/6 and direct all crew to muster stations as prescribed in the Muster List. Crew members shall be pre-briefed to proceed to muster stations without waiting for PA instructions, given the likelihood of communication system failure from impact damage.

Where the vessel has a designated citadel above the waterline within the structural protection of the accommodation, all non-essential crew shall be directed to the citadel upon detecting an aerial threat, consistent with OCIMF LM paper guidance. Doors and windows shall be closed and firefighting equipment shall be accessible from this area. The Damage Control Team shall assess the extent of damage and initiate response measures, taking into account the nature of the attack, the cargo type, the possibility of secondary explosions, and risks of fire spread, flooding, or toxic fumes. Extreme caution shall be exercised where unexploded ordnance may be present.

A complete headcount of all crew shall be conducted at muster stations immediately after the incident. Injured personnel shall be identified and provided immediate first aid. Crew records and family emergency contact details shall be maintained in a form and location accessible even if the Bridge sustains structural damage. The medical officer or first-aid-trained crew member shall provide immediate medical assistance. Where injuries require further attention, tele-medical advice shall be sought through Maritime Medical Advisory Services (TMAS) or the ship management company’s medical support system. Medical evacuation shall be arranged where feasible and permitted, in coordination with DGComm Centre, IFC-IOR, MRCC, and port authorities.

The distress communication shall include: vessel name, IMO number, MMSI, call sign; position in latitude and longitude; nature and type of attack; extent of damage; number of casualties and injuries; and immediate assistance required. Any suspicious activity not directly affecting the vessel shall also be reported, per DGS Circular No. 08 of 2024.

Abandonment shall be ordered only when remaining on board poses a greater risk to life than evacuation. The Master has sole authority over this decision under SOLAS and the ISM Code. Upon the order to abandon ship: lifeboats and liferafts shall be prepared for launching in accordance with SOLAS Chapter III; crew shall don life jackets and immersion suits; essential emergency supplies and communication equipment shall be taken to lifeboats where practicable; and a complete muster shall be verified before the vessel is abandoned.

Following evacuation, the Master or senior surviving officer shall prepare and verify a complete list of rescued crew and inform DGComm Centre, IFC-IOR, the ship management company, and relevant rescue coordination authorities. All rescued seafarers shall undergo medical examination at the earliest opportunity, with psychological counselling and mental health support arranged through the shipowner, ship management company, RPSL company, maritime welfare organisations, or relevant government authorities without delay.

In the event of fatalities, the mortal remains of deceased seafarers shall be handled with dignity and respect in accordance with MLC 2006 obligations and local regulations. Immediate notification shall be made to the ship management company, flag state administration, DGS, and the concerned Indian Embassy or Consulate. The ship management company shall facilitate timely repatriation of mortal remains consistent with the MLC 2006 framework.

Following stabilisation, the Master shall submit a detailed incident report to the shipowner, ship management company, RPSL company, flag state administration, DGS, and all relevant authorities. The report shall include: date, time, and position of the attack; nature of the attack and weapon type; extent of structural damage, fire, flooding, or equipment failure; number of crew with details of injuries, missing persons, or fatalities; crew actions taken; and details of rescue operations. All communications, photographs, logbook extracts, and records shall be preserved.

The shipowner, ship management company, and RPSL company shall make all necessary arrangements for the safe repatriation of crew in accordance with MLC 2006 Standard A2.5, including temporary accommodation, food and necessities, immigration formalities, coordination with airlines and embassies, and special care for injured or distressed seafarers. Where seafarers are evacuated without personal documents, the shipowner or RPSL company shall coordinate with the Flag State Administration and the Embassy of India or relevant Indian Consulate to facilitate emergency travel documents on a priority basis.

This SOP is promulgated under a DGS Order of 2026 and comes into force with immediate effect upon publication. All persons and entities to whom this SOP applies under Section A.6 are required to comply with its provisions. Non-compliance may attract action under the Merchant Shipping Act, 2025 and relevant rules framed thereunder including the Merchant Shipping (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping) Rules 2014 and applicable RPSL licensing regulations.

This SOP does not create new mandatory requirements beyond those established by the binding instruments listed in Section A.3. Where this SOP uses the word ‘shall’, it does so either to reflect an obligation already established under a binding instrument (identified in the relevant convention box) or to prescribe a course of action for giving effect to an existing obligation in the HRA context. Where this SOP uses the words ‘should’, ‘recommended’, or ‘consideration should be given’, the relevant measure is an operational recommendation informed by best practice and incident experience, and not a new mandatory requirement.